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The Gibson paradox, long observed by economists and named by John 
Maynard Keynes (1936), is a positive relationship between the interest 
rate and the price level. This paper explains the relationship by means of 
interest-rate, cost-push inflation. In the model, spending is driven in part 
by changes in the rate of interest, and the central bank sets the interest rate 
using a policy rule based on the levels of output and inflation. The model 
shows that the cost-push effect of inflation, long known as Gibson’s 
paradox, intensifies destabilizing forces and can be involved in the 
generation of cycles.  
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GIBSON’S PARADOX, MONETARY POLICY, AND THE 




The term “Gibson paradox” relates to observed positive correlation 
between the interest rate and the price level (Tooke 1838). One logical 
explanation, which has been propounded—but vigorously challenged—for 
ages is as follows. If interest rates are a cost of production and prices are 
based on costs, then interest rate rises would be passed along to consumers 
in the form of higher prices (Sraffa 1960; L. Taylor 1983; Garegnani 
1983; Dutt 1990–91; Pivetti 2001; Barth and Ramey 2001). As Taylor 
(2004) points out, this notion, “that the price level (and, by extension, the 
inflation rate) depends positively on the interest rate [,] has a checkered 
history.” It should be noted that there is even some modern evidence of the 
Gibson paradox, known by econometricians as the “price puzzle”’ 
(Hanson 2005). If this highly unconventional view were correct, high 
interest rates would be exactly the wrong medicine for inflation.  
This paper probes the implications of Gibson’s paradox, extending 
the model presented in Hannsgen (2004) with what I believe is a more 
satisfactory specification. First, a discussion of some of the theoretical 
issues involved precedes the substantive work of the paper.    3
2. The Role of the Gibson Paradox in Economic Models 
As pointed out in Hannsgen (2004), if the cost-push channel of monetary 
transmission were operative, one might imagine that counterinflationary 
monetary policy would generate instability; a higher inflation level leads 
the authorities to increase interest rates. This would have the effect of 
increasing inflation rather than containing it, forcing the authorities to 
again raise interest rates.   
The cost-push effects of interest rates have been used in formal 
models in the past (L. Taylor 1983; Dutt 1990–91). In Taylor’s model, for 
example, interest costs enter the pricing equation through working capital 
needs. In Dutt’s (1990–91) model, interest costs affect the mark-up firms 
must charge. Despite the insightfulness of these models, they treat 
monetary policy in an exogenous sense, which may not capture dynamics 
that are policy driven. In Taylor’s model, the money supply is exogenous. 
In Dutt’s model, the interest rate is exogenous and the money supply 
endogenous. In the period since those articles, a relatively new approach 
to modeling policy has gained acceptance in some circles. Rather than 
taking monetary policy (the interest rate) as a constant, recent authors have 
made it a function of central bank target variables, such as inflation and 
the output gap (J. Taylor 1993). This paper seeks to marry this new way of   4
modeling policy formation to a model in the spirit of L. Taylor and Dutt 
(Hannsgen 2004).  
The characteristics of the model are then as follows. First, 
equilibrium prices are determined by costs, plus a markup. Interest rates 
are determined by the central bank. In this case, the central bank is 
assumed to target inflation and output. Turning to the dynamics of output, 
in addition to a standard interest-rate effect, a Minskyan effect of interest-
rate changes on output is posited (Minsky 1986, esp. Ch. 9; Hannsgen 
2005). Along with the use of a policy-setting rule, this effect is, as far as 
the author knows, a second novel addition to a Gibson-effect model in 
Hannsgen (2004) and this paper. 
  Though this new model is based on Hannsgen (2004), it adds 
several new features. First, the policy setting rule, which has incremental 
changes toward a level dictated by a Taylor rule, fits with the usual 
understanding of Taylor rules better than the old one, which was stated 
strictly in terms of the rate of change of the interest rate. Second, a real 
interest rate level argument has been added to the aggregate demand 
equation, making the model more general. Third, to abstract from 
extraneous issues about incorrect price expectations affecting the real 
wage, “myopic perfect foresight” has been added to the wage Phillips 
curve, meaning that agents know, and act upon, the current derivative of   5
the price level. Fourth, a markup has been added to the price-setting 
process; this puts the model in the somewhat more natural environment of 
monopolistic price setting. Fifth, a clearer explanation of the adjustment 
process governing output has been added. The result of all these changes 
is a much more complex model, which reduces to a system of three 
nonlinear differential equations in three variables, rather than two 
equations in two variables. The proof of the dynamics is commensurately 
more involved. 
The results of the model are as follows. Proposition 1 below states 
that if three conditions on the parameters are satisfied, a limit cycle exists 
locally at the (conjectured) equilibrium point: in inflation-output-interest 
rate space, there is a closed cyclical path outside of the equilibrium point. 
The economy can be attracted to the cycle from everywhere in the state 
space except one. Alternatively, a “corridor of stability” exists, within 
which the economy tends to move toward the center. Propositions 2 and 3 
in the paper show that the sensitivity of the policy reaction function 
(Taylor rule) is an important determinant of the stability of the system— if 
it is too low or too high, the system will be unstable. The paper will now 
demonstrate how these results come about. 
   6
3. The Model 
Prices are driven by costs in this model. It is assumed that there are two 
factors of production: labor and bank loans. The production technology 
dictates that firms must hire “a” units of labor for each unit of output they 
want to produce. Moreover, output takes one period so that entrepreneurs 
must pay one period’s interest on their labor costs.
1 The entrepreneurs 
hence borrow from the banking system, which operates on a pure 
“overdraft” basis. That is, banks grant all needed loans at a given interest 
rate and in turn borrow needed reserves from the central bank 
(terminology from Hicks 1974; for modern accounts, see Moore 1988; 
Lavoie 1992; Wray 1998). Mathematically, these assumptions mean that 
costs are: 
C=(1+R).a.W 
Here and in subsequent equations, capital letters indicate variable 
names. Small letters are positive parameters or function names. Periods 
indicate multiplication. Small letters followed immediately by parentheses 
indicate functions. W is the hourly wage, a is the (fixed) labor/output ratio, 
R is the interest rate, and C is the cost of production of one unit of output.   
 
                                                 
1 Structuralists have emphasized the role of working capital in constructing models of the 
stagflationary effects of monetary contractions (Taylor 1983).   7
The story of the equation is as follows. Firms hire workers at the 
beginning of the period. They start with no money, but must pay wages in 
advance. Therefore, they borrow the full amount of their wage bill from 
banks. The central bank sets the interest rate for reserve borrowings and 
banks, which, for convenience, charge no markup. Firms pay workers the 
full amount of their wages, which are a.W times the amount produced. At 
the end of the period, firms sell their output. We will see that they charge a 
markup on their costs. For each unit of output, these costs include the 
wage bill, a.W and one period’s interest on the loan, r.a.W. The firm’s 
equilibrium receipts are a gross markup, m, times total unit costs 
(1+r).a.W, times the number of units sold. In a moment, we see how prices 
adjust to their equilibrium level of m times unit costs. After receiving its 
sales proceeds, the firm pays back its loan by making a deposit of 
(1+r).a.W. They retain a profit of (m-1).(1+r).a.w times units sold. 
Using the approximation that the logarithm of (1+R) is roughly R 
for small R, the equation for the logarithm C is: 
Ln(C) ≈ R + ln(a) + ln(W)        (1) 
where the function ln indicates the natural logarithm. It is assumed that 
prices adjust toward a fixed markup over costs, in a Kaleckian way. 
П = b.(ln(m.C) - ln(P))     (2) 
   8
where П is inflation ((dP/dt)/P), and P is the price level. Substituting (1) 
into (2) and differentiating by time, one gets: 
dП/dt = b.((dR/dt) + (dW/dt)/W – П)     (3) 
where the approximation is replaced by an equals sign for convenience. To 
flesh out the details of this equation, one assumes the following.  
R*=c(П-Π*,Y-Y
P) 
where R* is the central bank’s target interest rate, Y equals output or 
income, Π* and Y
P are target levels, and cΠ, cY > 0, using subscripts to 
indicate partial derivatives. The function c and all other functions are 
assumed to be smooth. The central bank determines the optimal interest 
rate as a function c of how far Y and Π diverge from their target levels. 
The function c is a very general form of a J. Taylor (1993) rule, which is 
often used largely as an ad-hoc construct in macroeconomic models. 
Interest rates are adjusted by the central bank according to its preferences 
regarding inflation and output levels. Next, we posit a process by which 
the central bank adjusts the policy interest rate toward its target level, R*. 
dR/dt = h.(R* -R)      (4) 
The constant h is a speed of adjustment of the interest rate toward 
the target given by the Taylor rule. Judd and Rudebusch (1998) have used 
a somewhat similar adjustment equation in connection with a Taylor rule,   9
arguing “Central banks often appear to adjust interest rates in a gradual 
fashion—taking small, distinct steps toward a desired setting.”  
The wage growth equation is: 
(dW/dt)/W = d(Y) + Π     (5) 
dY > 0. Wages are driven by the power of labor, which is positively 
affected by a vigorous economy (high Y). The inflation term indicates that 
there is no “money illusion” in the wage bargaining process; it can be 
thought of as a “myopic perfect foresight” expectations term (Flaschel, 
Franke, and Semmler 1997). Since workers know the current derivative of 
the price level, any existing inflation does not affect the outcome of the 
bargaining process in real terms. Though different assumptions about 
expectations formation may have important implications, these are 
somewhat extraneous to the issues examined in this paper. We do not wish 
to explore further how incorrect expectations of the price level might 
affect the business cycle, a hypothesis that has been amply discussed 
elsewhere. 
Plugging (4) and (5) into (3): 
dП/dt = b.(h.(c(П-Π*, Y-Y
P)- R) + d(Y))       (6) 
The demand side of the model features an “acceleration 
channel”— the rate of change of the interest rate affects output (Minsky 
1986 and Hannsgen 2005; see Minsky quotations within the latter).   10
  Interest rate changes can have an effect on the financial condition 
of banks and other firms, particularly when there is maturity mismatch 
between their assets and liabilities. Perhaps one of the most extreme cases 
is the savings-and-loan crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s. As Federal 
Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker raised interest rates, savings and 
loans found themselves losing deposits to instruments with a greater return 
than deposits. Eventually, savings and loan institutions were able to raise 
their deposit rates in an effort to retain funds. But the assets of savings and 
loan associations were mainly fixed-rate, long-term mortgages. Thus, even 
as savings and loans paid more for deposits, their income remained largely 
unchanged. The resulting squeeze was one factor that ultimately led to the 
loss of all positive net worth of the industry. Of course, it is admitted that 
the rate of change of the interest rate is not the same as the difference 
between short and long rates, but the acceleration term in aggregate 
demand is a simple way to capture the more complicated real-world 
phenomenon. 
   11
Nonetheless, a stylized stochastic model can be developed in which the 
two concepts are identical.
2  
To reflect these considerations, it is assumed that part of real 
aggregate demand (or sales) is a linear function of output and part is a 
function of the (expected) real interest rate and the rate of change of the 
interest rate.  
D = k + n.Y + e(dR/dt, R-Π) 
                                                 
2 Suppose there are two interest rates: 
 
Rt is the short period rate in period t. I can lend one dollar in period t and get back 1+Rt 
dollars in period t+1. 
 
rt is the long-term (two period) interest rate in period t. I can lend one dollar in period t 
and get back 1+rt dollars in period t+2. 
 
I hypothesize that the short-term interest rate follows a random walk: 
 
Rt+1 = Rt + et+1 
 




Et(Rt+1) = Rt    (1) 
  
where E is the expectations operator. Now suppose I assume an “expectations” theory of 
the determination of the interest rate. The two-period (long-term) interest rate is the 
average of this period’s short-term rate and the expectation of next period’s short-term 
rate. Using (1),  
 
rt = (Et(Rt+1) + Rt)/2 = Rt      (2) 
 
Then, shifting (2) back by one period, one can see that the difference between the current 
cost of funds and the “old,” long-term loans on the books is the same as the first 
difference of the short rate: 
 
 
R(t)-r(t-1) = R(t) – R(t-1) 
.   12
0 < n < l 
In accordance with the argument of the previous paragraphs, 
edR/dt<0 and eR<0. The Π term fits with the previous assumption of myopic 
perfect foresight. The mechanism equilibrating demand and supply is 
dY/dt = g.(D – Y) 
=  g.(k + n.Y + e(dR/dt, R-Π) – Y) 
= g.(k + n.Y + e(h.(c(П-Π*, Y-Y
P) – R), R-Π) - Y)     (7) 
It is assumed that excess or deficient demand results in an 
undesired change in inventories, so that demand always equals sales, if not 
output (Y). 
 
4. An Analysis of the Dynamics 
The dynamics can be previewed briefly. The system at issue is given by 
differential equations (4), (6), and (7), each in the variables П, Y, and R. 
First, the Gibson effect, as one might have foretold, has a tendency to 
destabilize the equilibrium point. Moreover, under certain, fairly weak, 
assumptions, it will be shown, the model fits locally into a well-known 
“genus” of cycles, which has recently been explored by L. Taylor (2004) 
and the Bielefeld School (for example, Flaschel, Franke, and Semmler 
1997; Chiarella and Flaschel 2000). This can be shown by the Hopf 
bifurcation theorem. If three conditions hold, the only unknown is whether   13
the local cycle is stable or unstable (subcritical or supercritical). Finally, 
very low or very high values of the sensitivity of policy to inflation 
guarantee instability. 
The formalities are as follows: 
PROPOSITION 1 
ASSUMPTIONS: 
(1) eR < h.edR/dt 
(2) h.cΠ.edR/dt < eR 
(3) the “nonzero speed” (non-inflection point) condition
3 
with all derivatives evaluated at the equilibrium point of the system, which 
is assumed to exist and be unique. Then the equilibrium point of  (4), (6), 
(7) loses asymptotic stability as b increases above a certain threshold level, 
through the (local) birth of a stable limit cycle or the death of an unstable 
limit cycle. (Further bifurcations may occur, creating more cycles.) 
PROOF (can be skipped): 
The general necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of a 3x3 




                                                 
3 This assumption involves a complicated equation involving all of the parameters not 
holding exactly. Details are available from the author. See below.   14
STABILITY CONDITIONS: 



















h c h c h
e h e g e c h n g e e c h g
h b d c h b c h b
Y
dt dR R dt dR Y R dt dR
Y Y
. .
) . .( ) . . 1 .( ) . . .(
. ) . .( . .
/ / /   
(2) Det (J) < 0 
(3) J*= 0
33 22 21 31
12 33 11 32





a a a a
a a a a
a a a a
 
where a11 is the first element of the first row of J, a 12 is the second element 
of the first row, etc. and the vertical lines indicate a determinant of the 
matrix within.  
We shall see that the three conditions above are met under 
assumptions 1 and 2 for a sufficiently low value of b: 
(1) the upper left term in Trace (J) is positive and the other two 
diagonal elements are negative. The upper left term can be made as 
small as desired by reducing b, so for sufficiently low b, this 
condition is met. 
(2) By a series of factorizations and elementary row operations, it can 
be seen that the determinant of J is b.g.h.dY.(cΠ-1).eR. It is clear 
that this determinant is negative for cΠ>1, which is guaranteed by   15
assumptions 1 and 2. Note that this is true regardless of the value 
of b. Hence, condition 2 is met. 
(3) The relevant matrix for condition 3 is: 
J*=
h c h e n g e e c h g c h
d c h b c b h c h
h b e h e g c h e n g c h b
Y dt dR R dt dR
Y Y Y
dt dR R Y dt dR
− + − − −
+ −




) . . 1 .( ) . . .( .
) . .( ) 1 . .( .
. ) . .( ) . . 1 .( . .
/ /
/ /
    
  The sign pattern of this matrix under assumptions 1 and 2 and for 





Note that the signs of the (1,1) and (2,2) elements of J* depend 
upon the smallness of b. The signs of the (1,2) and (3,2) elements rely on 
assumptions 1 and 2, respectively. I expand this determinant around the 
first row. The terms of the expansion corresponding to the (1,1) and (1,3) 
elements are unambiguously negative, given the sign pattern above. The 
(1,2)  term of the expansion is: 
- ) . .( / dt dR R e h e g − .([ Y c h. .( h c h e n g Y dt dR − + − ) . . 1 .( / )]+[ Π c h. . ) . .( Y Y d c h b +  ]) 
The first part (to the left of the first square bracket) is positive 
under Assumption 1. The first term in square brackets is negative by our   16
assumptions on signs (and n<1). The term in the second set of square 
brackets is positive, but it can be made arbitrarily small by making b 
sufficiently small. Thus, the expression as a whole is negative. 
Hence, for sufficiently small b, all three stability conditions above 
are met. Now, note that if we increase b, the first condition (and, by 
implication, the third) is no longer met. Since the first condition is 
necessary for stability, we then know that the equilibrium becomes 
unstable for relatively high values of b. [The real (parts of the) roots go 
from negative to positive.] To prove a Hopf bifurcation, I must show that 
as b increases, two roots cross the imaginary axis with nonzero speed 
(Gandolfo 1997, pp. 475-79). It can be shown that the roots are continuous 
functions of b, allowing an application of the intermediate value theorem. 
Since the stability condition goes from being met to not being met and 
since the determinant of J  (which is the product of the roots of J) stays 
nonzero as b is increased, we know that the loss of stability does not occur 
through a change from two real negative roots to two positive real roots 
(this would entail a zero determinant at the point of crossing). Hence, we 
know that the loss of stability occurs when two of the roots cross the 
imaginary axis from left to right, while the third root remains real and 
negative. [See Benhabib and Miyao 1981 for a mathematically similar 
proof with more details. In the appendix to that article, it is shown how to   17
prove the “nonzero speed” part of the Hopf theorem, which is not really 
restrictive. (See Assumption 3)]. 
 
PROPOSITION 2 
For cП < 1, the system described above is not stable. 
PROOF: 
Stability condition 2 in Proposition 1 is that det J < 0. The determinant is 
b.g.h.dY.(cΠ-1).eR 
This expression is positive if cП < 1. Since Condition 2 is a 
necessary condition for stability, the proposition easily follows. 
 
PROPOSITION 3 
For cП sufficiently large, given other parameters, the system is not stable. 
PROOF: 
Stability condition 1 in Proposition 1 says that the trace of J must be 
negative. The (1,1) term of J is positive and can be made as large as 
necessary by increasing cП. The (2, 2) and (3, 3) elements of J do not 
involve this parameter. Since stability condition 1 is a necessary condition 
for stability, the result follows.  
What is the economic meaning of the dynamics? Assumption 1 
requires that the conventional interest rate effect in the “IS” curve be   18
relatively strong compared to the term based on the rate of change of the 
interest rate. This should be a cautionary note about the desirability of this 
innovation, but Minsky and other people who have proposed this 
mechanism have often asserted that it generates instability, anyway. 
Assumption 2 indicates that cΠ, the sensitivity of the central bank’s 
reaction function to inflation, be fairly strong. This is a well-known 
condition for stability of models in which a Taylor rule appears 
(Proposition 2). However, cΠ, as it appears in the inflation equation, is 
part of one of the positive terms in the trace of J (the 1,1 element) and so 
contributes to the eventual generation of instability once it gets too high 
(Proposition 3). So, highly responsive policy has a destabilizing effect 
insofar as interest rates appear in the price equation. (A sufficiently strong 
“Gibson effect”, given constant values of all the other parameters, 
eventually creates instability.)  Finally, the conditions for a cycle are not 
extremely restrictive.  
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The implication of the foregoing analysis is that one must be aware of 
possible perverse effects in implementing monetary policy. The model 
above incorporates a positive impact of interest rates on prices, with the   19
novel addition of a central bank policy-setting function and a Minskyan 
AD curve that makes output a function of both the level and the rate of 
change of the interest rate.  
An effect arising jointly from the inclusion of interest among the 
costs of production and the central bank’s response to inflation leads to 
instability for certain parameter values. An important policy implication of 
the stability condition is that sufficiently high or low levels of the 
derivative with respect to inflation in the interest-rate-setting function 
always destabilize the model. A moderate value for the inflation parameter 
in the Taylor rule therefore seems desirable from a policy point of view. A 
complicated set of effects is involved, but the key causal chain is that an 
increase in inflation increases the central bank’s tendency to raise rates, 
which only exacerbates the original inflationary problem.  
Assuming the satisfaction of three conditions on the model 
parameters, some form of local cycle exists in inflation-output-interest rate 
space. The conditions arise, from the policy function, as mentioned, and 
from the relative strength of the effects of the interest rate and the rate of 
change of the interest rate on the demand side. The cycle may take the 
form of a “corridor of stability”, within which all paths lead to the 
equilibrium, or a stable limit cycle, to which all paths lead.     20
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